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AND BUSH v. GORE
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay (in Sections I and II) briefly traces the evolution of
modem equal protection doctrine in order to point (in Section III)
to a disparate but substantial group of equal protection decisions that
do not fit, and that the Court did not pretend to fit, into one of the
officially identified three tiers of Equal Protection Clause analysis.
The Essay (in Section IV) defends the viewpoints, attributed to Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens, that (1) proper equal protection scrutiny
demands differing levels of justification for state policies, depending
on the nature of the group lines drawn by the state classification and
the nature of the benefit that the classification has burdened; and (2)
Supreme Court opinions applying the Equal Protection Clause would
be improved if Justices honored an obligation in each instance to in-
dicate in some detail how they assess each of these for the case at
hand, rather than resting upon the talismanic invocation of labels
like "suspect classification," "fundamental right," and so forth. As
part of the argument that such a doctrinal reform would have salutary
consequences, the Essay (in Section V) then points out ways in which
such doctrinal obligations, were they to be imposed, might have al-
tered the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore.
I. BIRTH AND MATURATION OF THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
2Three score and three years ago, in the Carolene Products footnote,
modem equal protection doctrine was conceived. 3 Its two-stage birth
" Leslie Friedman Goldstein,Judge Hugh M. Morris Professor of Political Science and Inter-
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serv maintained by Professor Eugene Volokh of UCLA Law School and the LAWCOURTS list-
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531 U.S. 98 (2000).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The footnote
reads:
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occurred during the 1940s: the fundamental rights piece of the doc-
trine in Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 and the suspect classification segment of
it in Korematsu v. United States.s Skinner established that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause mandates that a state classification depriving a particu-
lar group of "fundamental," "basic civil rights" must be subjected to
"strict scrutiny." Korematsu (although it notoriously upheld the law in
question) declared that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect .... [C] ourts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. [They may be upheld
only when justified by] [p]ressingpublic necessity [on the magnitude of]
the gravest imminent danger to the public safety."
7
These non-identical twin prongs of fundamental rights strict scru-
tiny and suspect classification strict scrutiny reached maturity in the
mid-1960s, when the Warren Court relied on them to strike down a
wide array of statutory classifications that limited the rights of one or
another group. In 1964, and again in 1967, the Court finally de-
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion, is to be subjected to more exactingjudicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious or national or racial minorities: whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
' It occurred, to be sure, within a discussion of a Due Process Clause challenge, but the
Court spoke nonetheless in the broader terminology of applying "the general prohibitions of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
' 316 U.S. 535 (1942). To be sure, Skinner did not fit comfortably into the strict scrutiny
categories set forth in the Caro!ene footnote, butJustice Douglas tried valiantly to squeeze it into
them. First, he argued that the procreation right of which the petitioner was to be deprived was
"one of the basic civil rights of man," "fundamental," and "a basic liberty." Id. at 541. This lan-
guage appeared to liken procreation to the First Amendment rights (within the first of the Caro-
/ene categories warranting "more exacting judicial scrutiny," 304 U.S. at 152 n.4), in that the
Court had recently noted in cases like Lovell v. Griffin that, "[f]reedom of speech and freedom
of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
from invasion by state action." 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (emphasis added). Second, he insisted
repeatedly on the linkage between protecting the fundamental right of procreation and the
need to protect the survival of unpopular racial groups: The procreation right "is basic to the
perpetuation of a race .... [It is] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.
[When a state sterilizes one group of criminals but not another who committed a crime of equal
turpitude, it makes] as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or na-
tionality for oppressive treatment." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536, 541.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added).
323 U.S. at 216, 218 (emphasis added).
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ployed the strict scrutiny/suspect classification language to declare
unconstitutional some racially discriminatory statutes. These laws
criminalized, respectively, the "occupy[ing] in the nighttime [of] the
same room" by a "negro man and white woman or any white man and
negro woman,"8 and any marriage between a white and a non-white
(other than a descendant of Pocahontas!). 9 In McLaughlin v. Florida,
the Court explained that under strict scrutiny any "constitutionally
suspect" classification could be upheld only if clearly shown to serve
"some overriding statutory purpose"" and if demonstrated to be "neces-
sary, and not merely rationally related, to the [purpose]."" Loving v.
Virginia then reiterated McLaughlin's suspect classification/strict scru-
tiny language to reach similar results.
2
In 1964, the Court used fundamental rights/strict scrutiny lan-
guage to apply the Equal Protection Clause for the first time since
Skinner, to strike down malapportioned legislative district lines on the
grounds that the right to vote is a "fundamental political right" and
therefore "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.",3 In 1966 the Court
repeated this rule to declare that conditioning the right to vote on
payment of a (maximum) $1.50 annual tax amounted to invidious
discrimination. 4
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.05 (re-
pealed 1964)).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 5 n.4 (1967).
379 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added).
Id at 196 (emphasis added).
12 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (citations omitted). Many scholars and case-
books perceive Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (ruling that a state must supply a free trial
transcript to an indigent convict desiring to appeal his conviction where the appeal generally is
allowed and a transcript is required) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (ruling that
the State must supply free counsel to an indigent desiring to exercise a statutory right to ap-
peal) as precursors in this line of fundamental rights equal protection cases. While the Equal
Protection Clause is prominently mentioned in Griffin and its progeny, I consider these cases to
be best understood as fundamental faimess procedural due process cases.
" Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). In Harper and a number of other
cases (e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)) leading up
to San Antonio Independent SchoolDistrict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court majority spoke
of poverty also as a "disfavored," "invidious," or "suspect" classification. See Harper, 383 U.S. at
passim. Later cases have stayed away from this rhetoric, although sometimes the Court does rule
that fees must be waived for the indigent when fundamental rights are at stake. E.g., M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (ruling fundamental the right of access to courts to appeal a termi-
nation of parental rights, on the grounds that when penalties as severe as termination of par-
enthood are threatened, the procedure is properly viewed as "quasi-criminal" and due process
demands that access to judicial process may not turn on ability to pay); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (finding a tenant's claim to his house to be a fundamental right and noting the
unique harm to indigents in ruling arbitrary a bond requirement of double the accrued rent
pending an appeal of eviction, because of its dissimilarity to bonds in comparable civil actions);
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (ruling that because of the basic importance of
marriage in society and the unique role of the state in divorce, indigents have a fundamental
right of access to courts to obtain a divorce).
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In 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut," the Court declared that there is
a right of marital privacy that includes the freedom to use contracep-
fives and that it is a fundamental right. SeveralJustices in the major-
ity borrowed language that had been deployed in First Amendment
cases to complete the paradigm (only sketched in Skinner) for apply-
ing fundamental rights strict scrutiny.16 The paradigm was to include
the test of necessity for a compelling interest. Writing for a five Jus-
tice majority, Douglas found regulations that restrict constitutionally
"protected freedoms" may not "sweep unnecessarily broadly."17 Gov-
ernment, absent a showing of a compelling, subordinating state in-
terest could not "take away the right to procreate" added Goldberg
for three of the Justices from the majority.' 8 Statutes regulating pro-
tected liberties "must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose""9 and "the State may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," con-
curredJustice White, writing separately."
A four Justice plurality of the Court declared in 1972 that if (as
seemed apparent to the Court) the ban on contraceptive distribution
to unmarried people was meant to express the state's moral condem-
nation of contraceptive use per se (as presumably limited by Griswold
such that married couples had to be exempted), such a ban was
nonetheless invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause because "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."21 Having declared
that this fundamental right accrued to single persons, the Court then
concluded that the state did not have adequately "warranted" justifi-
cation for the statutory line permitting married but not unmarried
persons to receive contraceptives to exercise this right.
By 1968,22 the Court had explicitly applied the approach deline-
ated in Griswold for due process, fundamental rights analysis (and in
'5 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"The Griswold context was the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, but the para-
digm then quickly carried over to the equal protection fundamental rights cases.
" 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
IS Id. at 496 (Goldberg,J., concurring). See also id. at 497 ("[W]here fundamental personal
liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regula-
tory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose.").
" Id. at 503-04 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960)).
Id. (WhiteJ., concurring) (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
2 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added) (emphasis removed from
"individual") (citations omitted). While the decision was 6-1 as to the holding of unconstitu-
tionality, the division was 4-3 on behalf of this rule of law. Justices Blackmun and White would
have struck down the law simply on the grounds that it unnecessarily burdened the right of
marital privacy.
, ' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down under the Equal Protection Clause
excessively burdensome ballot access requirements for minor parties).
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numerous First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess cases) to decide an equal protection case concerning the funda-
mental right to cast an effective vote. Instead of the vague "carefully
scrutinize" language of Reynolds and Harper, the Court in Williams v.
Rhodes flatly stated the need for the state to meet the "compelling in-
terest" test when such rights were burdened .
In 1969,24 the Supreme Court again explicitly applied this compel-
ling interest test for equal protection fundamental rights scrutiny.
The Court noted that the right to travel freely from one state to an-
other was implicitly protected by a number of constitutional provi-
sions-including Article IV, Section 2, the Commerce Clause, and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-
and that therefore any classification burdening it "unless shown to be
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconsti-
tutional." 5 Applying this test, the Court declared unconstitutional a
state rule forbidding newcomers to the state from receiving welfare
benefits until they had resided there for one year.
In the same year, the Court used the same necessity/compelling
interest test to declare void a law prohibiting residents who were not
property owners or parents of schoolchildren from voting in school
district elections.26
II. THE NEWER EQUAL PROTECTION
By the time of Eisenstad7 in 1972, the modern, two-tiered equal
protection doctrine had fully matured. It was now "the new equal
protection," which supplemented the old minimal scrutiny tier with a
new, full-blown strict scrutiny tier that was to be applied in either of
two specified situations: (1) to examine the constitutionality of laws
imposing suspect classifications;8 and (2) to test the constitutionality
of statutes restricting or burdening judicially identified fundamental
rights (those rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights as well as the
rights to vote, interstate travel, and procreative privacy).29
2 Id. at 31 (noting that a First Amendment right, freedom of political association, and the
right to cast an effective vote were burdened, but invoking the "compelling interest" test as ap-
propriate for each).
" SeeShapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
2 394 U.S. at 634.
See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
In 1971, in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, the Court added alienage to nationality
and race as a basis of classification to be presumed invidious and therefore "suspect," triggering
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Although alienage discrimination is not as
uniformly declared invalid as racial discrimination, the line of progeny from Graham has proved
sturdy. Race had been presumed invidious since the beginning of Fourteenth Amendment liti-
gation. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1873). Nationality followed shortly thereafter. SeeYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
' It is worth noting that the Caroene Products footnote did two things. First, it set forththe
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Exactly at this point, Gerald Gunther published his classic Harvard
Law Review article on the "newer" equal protection."' No sooner than
the Supreme Court had created the new equal protection, it pro-
duced in the late 1960s and early 1970s a group of equal protection
cases that fit neither the old (minimal scrutiny, or lower tier) nor the
new (fundamental rights/suspect classification, or upper tier) equal
protection framework.
In these cases, the "newer" group, the Court was purporting to
apply the old equal protection scrutiny-i.e., the minimal rationality
test-but was producing rulings that indicated some sort of height-
ened scrutiny was in fact being applied. By 1972, this group of be-
tween-the-tiers cases included two cases concerning rights of persons
born out-of-wedlock ("illegitimates" in judicial terminology), 31 two• • 32
cases concerning sex discrimination, and a few other cases that fit
no easy categorization.3
doctrine that there could properly be under the Fourteenth Amendment what has come to be
called a two-tier approach: minimal scrutiny for most legislative classifications or restrictions on
liberty, and a stricter scrutiny for restrictions on more fundamental liberties and more invidious
classifications. In this sense the footnote contained the germ of these modem equal protection
developments. Second, it attempted to cabin the judicial discretion or judicial power implied
in allowing a variety of ways to apply the Fourteenth Amendment, by restricting strict scrutiny to
what John Hart Ely has called "representation reinforcing" concers-concems that are linked
to the Fourteenth Amendment text in that they describe the political "process" that is "due" to
Americans. In this second effort the footnote had failed within four years, as exemplified in the
Skinner case. Just asJustice Douglas tried there to squeeze his fundamental rights analysis into
the suspect classification box where it clearly did not fit, see supra note 4, he tried again in Gris-
wold to squeeze the right of marital procreational "privacy" into the implications of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, evidently attempting to find shelter under the
Caroene category "when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments." Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152, n.4.
" Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of EvolvingDoctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
" Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
" Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (ruling unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds a state law that recouped costs of appeal transcripts from the prison wages of incarcer-
ated indigents but demanded no reimbursement from indigent appellants not in prison, over
the dissent [Harlan] that found the administrative convenience was rational grounds for the
distinction);Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (ruling unconstitutional on equal protec-
tion grounds a more lenient commitment standard for those mental incompetents who are
charged with a crime but are unable to stand trial);James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (rul-
ing unconstitutional on equal protection grounds a state law denying a variety of exemptions to
indigent defendants suing for reimbursement of defense fees by the state where the exemptions
were allowed to other debtors in civil judgments).
Gunther could have cited two additional cases: Baxstrom v. HeroKl 383 U.S. 107 (1966)
(ruling it a violation of equal protection to civilly commit a prisoner at the end of his sentence
without a jury trial for the civil commitment, where such a jury trial was available to any non-
prisoner) and Lindsey v. Normet 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (finding a violation of equal protection for a
state to require that in order to appeal a summary eviction process for non-payment of rent, the
appellant post a bond equal to twice the amount of the rent that would accrue pending the de-
cision, which was twice what was required of appellants of other civil actions).
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Noticing this development, Gunther-in what has become one of
the most cited law review articles ever34---suggested that the Justices
would be well advised to develop a "modestly interventionist model"
of equal protection jurisprudence 5 -one that would look for a sub-
stantially reasonable fit between legislative classification and stated
legislative purpose, and would do so for all equal protection chal-
lenges rather than just those singled out by the Justices for special
treatment.
Instead, in the very next term the Supreme Court majority in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue 6 went to elaborate
lengths to attempt to cabin what was starting to look like explosive
growth in equal protection jurisprudence. Justice Powell wrote an
opinion emphatically finding only two available levels of scrutiny: if
the equal protection challenge concerned either a suspect classifica-
tion or a fundamental rights restriction, then strict scrutiny was in or-
der; otherwise, minimal rationality was all that the Court would re-
quire. In Rodriguez, however-where the litigants wanted the
property tax-based system of extremely unequal school funding de-
clared invalid because they viewed education as a fundamental right
and poverty as a suspect classification-Powell insisted to the contrary
that the only constitutionally protected fundamental rights were
those the constitutional text identified either explicitly or implicitly
and that the purported right to an education did not fit this descrip-
tion. 7 Earlier Court statements referring to poverty as "suspect," he
insisted, had all involved deprivations of a right identified either ex-
plicitly or implicitly in the constitutional text, and therefore poverty
could not trigger strict scrutiny in a case of this sort (since no such
right was involved).38
Justice Marshall, with Justice Douglas in concurrence, dissented,
arguing somewhat along the lines of the Gunther essay, that a "newer
equal protection" was not only appropriate and fair, but also de-
scribed what the Court in fact had been doing.39 This "newer" equal
protection had examined, and should continue to examine, under
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985). As of
1985, it was not only the most cited law review article but also was well in the lead for articles
published after 1979. Shapiro has since revised this list and now lists Gunther as the third most
cited article, as of 1996. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-
KENT. L. REv. 751, 767 (1996).
Gunther, supra note 30, at 43.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
It is striking that no one accused Justice Powell of whistling in the dark, since the Court
had just handed down Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), protecting the most controversial un-
enumerated right of modern jurisprudence (although Justice Marshall's dissent did bring up
the unenumerated rights protected in Eisenstadt and Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 100, 103-04 (Mar-
shall,J., dissenting)).
" Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-35.
Id. at 110 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, in fact, cited Gunther in his dissent.
See id. at 110 n.67.
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equal protection challenges, both the "invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn" and "the constitu-
tional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected" by
it.40 Depending on these factors, the Court appropriately varied the
degree of justification that it required from the state. The more
likely the classification was to reflect sheer prejudice, and the more
important the interest was in relation to constitutional values, the
greater the burden ofjustification that should be put on the state.
Justice White wrote his own dissentjoined by Justices Douglas and
Brennan, in which he argued that the property tax-based school
funding scheme in question did not even meet the "rationality" test."
Clearly, Justice White was using a stiffened version of what he called
the "rationality" test, a version that Gunther had termed "rationality
with bite."42 In other words, White's approach to the Powell-Marshall
standoff in Rodriguez was to remain silent about it but to follow the
advice ofJustice Marshall, except thatJustice White called the fluctuat-
ing degree of scrutiny the old rationality approach.
The Court's way of handling challenges to discrimination with re-
spect to gender and to out-of-wedlock births continued to stray out-
side the lines of the tidy framework constructed by Justice Powell, and
by 1976 the Court admitted that in fact there were three tiers of equal
protection scrutiny. The middle "intermediate" tier applied to gen-
der discrimination and to discrimination against persons born out-of-
wedlock.13 It required that classifications based on gender or on out-
of-wedlock birth in order to satisfy equal protection would have to be
shown to be "substantially related" to an important government in-
terest.4
4' Id. at 99 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
Id. at 67-70 (Douglas, Brennan & White,JJ., dissenting).
Gunther, supra note 30, at 18-22.
'3 For gender, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and its progeny. For a discussion of
this line of cases see LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
CASES IN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE (2d ed. 1988). For illegitimacy, the Court did not formally
announce that itwas using the Craigtest until 1988 in Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (striking
dovn a six-year statute of limitations for bringing paternity actions on behalf of non-marital
children). The Court appeared, however, to follow the Craig approach beginning with cases in
1977. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (striking down a two-year deadline for paternity
and child support actions for non-marital children); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982)
(striking down a law setting one-year time deadlines for a suit for child support for non-marital
children); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a law banning intestate inheritance by
non-marital children unless there was ajudicial finding of paternity during the father's lifetime,
on the grounds that there was a substantial relation between the law and important state inter-
ests); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down a ban on intestate inheritance
from their fathers by non-marital children).
" Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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III. NEWEST EQUAL PROTECTION
This official Court embrace of a newer (albeit not Gunther's
newer) equal protection standard did not manage to solve the prob-
lem of providing predictable guidelines for all of the Court's equal
protection challenges. The Court continued from time to time to
hand down decisions that did not fit the criteria for elevation to ei-
ther the strict or intermediate tier and yet that offended the Court's
sense of fairness to the point that the Court declared them violations
of equal protection, even though legislatures virtually never adopt
laws for literally no reason. Due to the continuing occurrence of
such "outlier" cases4 ---by which I mean equal protection decisions for
which the Court has yet to account by a coherent theory-one en-
counters periodically law review articles, in the mode of Gunther's
(or of Professor Baker's remarks at this Symposium),46 still calling for
or heralding a new (or NEW newer, if three-tier scrutiny should be
thought of as the simply "newer") equal protection scrutiny.u
When the Court established the intermediate scrutiny standard in
Craig, Justice Stevens (just one year after joining the Court) con-
curred separately to explain that in his honest judgment there was,
properly speaking, neither a dual nor a tri-part but only a single stan-
dard for equal protection review: the clause requires impartial
treatment by every state.48 Stevens urged that the Court, rather than
describe itself as being guided by one of three fixed standards, move
toward specifying in each equal protection case the considerations
motivating the particular decision as to whether impartiality had been
violated. 9 In effect, Stevens was endorsing something close to the
' The term "outlier" is from Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Juris-
prudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL L. REV. 1209
(1999).
" See Professor Edwin Baker, Introductory Address at the University of PennsylvaniaJournal
of Constitutional Law Symposium: Equal Protection After the Rational Basis Era (Feb. 2-3,
2001) (videotape on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
47 Raffi S. Barougian, Note, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal Protec-
tion Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 LOY.
LA. L. REV. 1277 (1997); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of
Equality, 12 LAW & INEQ.J. 381 (1994); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the
Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357 (1999); R. Randall
Kelso, Filling Gaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation: Standards,
Ends, and Burdens Reconsidered, 33 S. TEX. L. REV. 493 (1992); R. Randall Kelso, Three Years Hence:
An Update on FillingGaps in the Supreme Court's Approach to Constitutional Review of Legislation, 36 S.
TEX. L. REv. 1 (1995); Nice, supra note 45; Brenda Swierenga, Comment, Still Newer Equal Protec-
tion: Impermissibe Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1454 (1986);John D. Wil-
son, Comment, Cleburne: An Evolutionary Step in Equal Protection Analysis, 46 MD. L. REV. 163
(1986).
Craig 429 U.S. at 211-13 (Stevens,J., concurring).
Id. at 212 (Stevens,J., concurring) (stating that he believed that "the two-tiered analysis of
equal protection claims ... is a method ... to explain decisions that actually apply a single
standard" and that standard may be identified more easily through a "careful explanation of the
reasons motivating particular decisions").
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variable approach defended by Marshall in the Rodriguez case,50 for
Stevens spoke of analyzing the degree of offensiveness of the classifi-
cation, the likelihood that it reflected unthinking (prejudiced) dis-
crimination, the gravity of the burden it placed on those who were
disfavored by it, and the strength of the likely benefit to the public
from the discrimination in question.5 ' This still left only two Justices
in favor of some version of the Marshall position, for Justice Stevens
had replaced Douglas, who had been the sole other Justice to align
himself with Marshall's earlier opinion. 2
Also, as had happened in Rodriguez, at leastJustice Stewart in Craig
insisted that the statute in question represented "total irrationality"
rather than accept the idea of openly espousing flexible standards of
scrutiny,3 even though some of his own colleagues on the Court
(Burger and Rehnquist) insisted that the statute was in fact rationally
related to legitimate state interests. 4 In other words, certain Justices
evidently believe it is better to apply a somewhat heightened version
of the rationality test-certainly one stiffer than the most minimal
versions the Court sometimes describes5  -than it is to admit to the
public that the degree ofjustification demanded from the state to sat-
isfy "equal protection" varies depending on: (1) the nature of the
group line that the state is drawing and (2) on the constitutional
value of the interest that the state is burdening or withdrawing by its
classification. Moreover, the variation in degree of justification has
two dimensions: the importance of the benefit the state claims it de-
rives from the classification, and the strength of the logical and em-
pirical connection between the classification and the goal that the
state is pursuing. Justice Stevens's lone call in Craig for the kind of
detailed elaboration of the multiplicity of considerations that shape
equal protection scrutiny succeeded no better than Justice Marshall's
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's holding that the State did not discriminate in the
provision of public educational opportunities to children in poorer school districts).
" See Craig 429 U.S. at 213-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing possible motivations be-
hind the challenged law).
" Compare Rodriguez; 411 U.S. at 70-137 (Marshall,J., dissenting), with Craig, 429 U.S. 211-14
(Stevens, J., concurring) (using an analysis similar to that employed injustice Marshall's Rodri-
guez dissent, which was joined by Justice Douglas).
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 215 (StewartJ., concurring) (stating that "[the disparity created by
these Oklahoma statutes amounts to total irrationality" because the State "fail[s] to prove...
that 3.2% beer is somehow more deleterious when it comes into the hands of a male aged 18-20
than of a female of like age").
See i& at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In Helerv. Doe; 509 U.S. 312 (1993), for instance, the Court said that ordinary equal pro-
tection scrutiny accords laws "a strong presumption of validity" and upholds the law "if there is a
rational relationship" with "some legitimate governmental purpose," whether or not the legisla-
ture ever articulated the purpose, and that the law must be upheld "if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." I&. at 319-20
(quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
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earlier attempt to attract a majority to the open announcement that
equal protection analysis operated on a kind of sliding scale.
What appears to prevail most of the time instead is a sub silentio
embrace of the sliding scale approach. Generally, the Court has no
reason to mention it, because most equal protection challenges
where the Court wishes to strike down the classification can be fit into
one of the stricter scrutiny tiers. Alternatively, where the Court finds
the classification inoffensive, the rationality test applies well. Occa-
sionally, however, a majority of the Justices believes a measure
adopted by state officials, a state legislature, or even a referendum
electorate-comprised for the most part of rational human beings
pursuing their honest conception of the public interest-nonetheless
violates the principle that Stevens called "impartiality," and yet does
not fit one of the stricter scrutiny categories. On these occasions,
the majority strikes down the statute in one of two ways: Either the
Justices claim (unpersuasively in my mind, for the reason just stated)
that the statute lacks a rational relation to a legitimate aspect of the
public interest, or they more frankly acknowledge that they are de-
manding a more substantial justification from the state (but not one
identical to the test of necessity-for-a-compelling-interest), a justifica-
tion that the state failed to provide. Even when the Court takes the
latter approach, because it does not openly embrace the logic de-
fended either by Justice Marshall or byJustice Stevens, the Court still
confuses commentators and the public. 8 Moreover, the Court's reti-
cence about the nature of its constitutional analysis does not seem to
produce any compensatory benefit for the confusion caused, such as
according more respect to the legislative judgment behind laws that
do not fit either of the two elevated scrutiny categories. A table of at
least eleven such cases that the Court has produced since Rodriguez
follows below:5 9
See infra table for list of examples.
Cases that seem to fit this latter mold in the post-Rodriguez period would include two that
engage in what might be called quasi-fundamental rights analysis, and three that might be
characterized as containing quasi-suspect classification analysis. The former two are Plyer v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (actually, this one fits both categories, since the classification too was
problematic), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); the latter three areDepartment of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985), and Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). For further details, see infta table.
See Farrell, supra note 47. After a careful, thoughtful, and unusually honest examination
of ten of the cases after Rodriguez where the Court did not claim to be applying either of the two
upper tiers of scrutiny but nonetheless rejected rational arguments for the law and judged it a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Farrell, for instance, concludes: "Is it too much to ask
that the Court decide cases consistently and predictably? Apparently the answer to this ques-
tion is yes .... The Court continues to write opinions as if they matter, but the Court's juris-
prudence of heightened rationality is difficult to understand." Id. at 415.
"Ten of these cases were singled out in Farrell, supra note 47. I have added M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
to his compilation. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
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TABLE
Between-the-Tiers Equal Protection Cases
After San Antonio v. Rodriguez
CASE
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno
413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(ruling unconstitutional a denial of
food stamps to individuals who live
in households of unrelated individu-
als).
Zobelv. Williams
457 U.S. 55 (1982)
(ruling unconstitutional a 1980 stat-
ute distributing monetary benefits to
adult residents in proportion to
length of residence in the state since
1959).
Plyler v. Doe
457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(ruling unconstitutional a law deny-
ing free public schooling to children
of illegal aliens).
Metro. Lfe Ins. Co. v. Ward
470 U.S. 869 (1985)
(ruling unconstitutional a state tax
rate differential on premiums favor-
ing in-state insurance companies
over out-of-state ones).
WUlams v. Vernont
472 U.S. 14 (1985)
(ruling unconstitutional a state 'use"
tax imposed on registrants of cars
purchased out-of-state by non-
residents at time of purchase).
Hooper v. Bernalllo County Assessor
472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(ruling unconstitutional a 1981 state
law giving property tax exemption to
Vietnam veterans who had resided in
state prior to 1976).
MATORITY
& AUTHOR
7-2 Brennan
RATIONALE
Interests suggested by government
lacked [adequately] rational tie to
the classification; apparent legisla-
tive purpose to exclude politically
unpopular group (hippies); statute
"wholly without rational basis."
8-1 Burger State goal of rewarding residents for
length of residence as proxy for past
service to state not legitimate; other
asserted goals not plausibly tied to
statute.
5-4 Brennan Education is not a "fundamental
right" and illegal alienage is not a
"suspect classification." Education is
important for our society and it is
unfair to punish children for par-
ents' choices. State goal furthered
would have to be "substantial." State
failed to convince Court with "credi-
ble evidence" that its substantial
goals were furthered by this law.
5-4 Powell Purpose of the law-"to promote
domestic industry"-is a forbidden
purpose.
5-3 White Discrimination against former non-
residents who had purchased out-of-
state as compared to a resident who
did so lacked a rational relation to
the purpose of having those who use
roads pay for them.
5-3 Burger Discrimination among veterans be-
tween long-standing and more-
recent residents of state to favor the
former is not rationally related to
state goal of rewarding veterans, and
the goal of rewarding only long-term
residents for being veterans is im-
permissible.
Jan. 2002]
JOURNVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc.
473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(ruling unconstitutional, as applied,
a zoning ordinance that required a
special use permit for homes for the
"insane, feeble-minded, alcoholics,
or drug addicts," where such permit
was denied to a home for the men-
tally retarded).
Allegheny Pittsburg Coal Co. v. County
Comm'n
488 U.S. 336 (1989)
(ruling unconstitutional county tax
assessment scheme based solely on
most recent purchase price where
state law required assessment based
on "estimated market value").
Quinn v. Millsap
491 U.S. 95 (1989)
(ruling unconstitutional state consti-
tutional provision restricting mem-
bership on appointed city-county
reorganization board to real prop-
erty owners).
Romer v. Evans
517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(ruling unconstitutional state consti-
tutional amendment forbidding any
law, action or policy by the state, its
agents, or its subdivisions to entitle
persons of homosexual orientation
to claim (unlawful) discrimination).
M.L.B. v. S.L.J.
519 U.S. 102 (1996)
(ruling unconstitutional state re-
quirement that an indigent wishing
to appeal a termination-of-parental-
rights order must pay in advance the
cost of preparing transcript of the
trial (here more than $2,000)).
9-0 White
9-0
Rehnquist
Despite unanimity on holding, five
Justices offered rationales different
from that of White's "opinion of the
Court," that this application of the
law bore so little relation to the as-
serted legislative goals that it was
"apparently reflecting sheer ani-
mus." Two of the five defended
Stevens' fluid rationality approach,
which varies the requirement for
degree of justification based on de-
gree of likely invidiousness of classi-
fication and substantiality of the
benefit being restricted. Three de-
fended Marshall's approach that
would explicitly tighten the degree
of scrutiny (i.e., not call it "rational"
scrutiny) in proportion to the de-
gree of likely invidiousness of the
classification and to the "constitu-
tional and social importance of the
interest adversely affected."
Court rejected county rationale that
the savings accrued from not fre-
quently estimating market value
compensated for tax revenue lost by
failure to frequently update assess-
ments. Court also judged the tax
preference for long-held properties
arbitrary in light of state law.
9-0 Link between property ownership
Blackmun and knowledgeability desired for
membership on this board so at-
tenuated that the classification fails
the rationality test.
6-3 Kennedy Sweeping breadth of the deprivation
of benefits is so discontinuous with
state's asserted purposes that the
classification must be judged the
result of "sheer animus" and there-
fore lacking "a rational relation to
legitimate state interests."
6-3
(on equal
protection
with one
concurrence
on due proc-
ess grounds)
Ginsburg
"Fundamental" and decision to ter-
minate is "quasi-criminal" proceed-
ing, so the importance of the as-
serted government interest must be
examined "closely and contextually"
in avoiding termination of parental
rights. State goal of saving money is
insufficiently substantial in these
circumstances.
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I argue in the next Section that the Court should be more forth-
coming about its own sense of what guides its analysis in these "be-
tween-the-tiers" cases, and indeed in all its equal protection jurispru-
dence. My defense of this view will then be elaborated with specific
respect to how such a candidly detailed approach might have played
out with more salutary results in the Bush v. Gore° decision.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF CANDOR
When Gerald Gunther first pleaded for more candor from the
Court deploying the equal protection approach that he identified as
"rationality with bite," he quoted Justice Jackson at some length on
behalf of this view. Gunther's excerpt included the following pas-
sage:
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Gov-
ernment must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between
their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly re-
lated to the object of regulation. This equality is not merely abstractjus-
tice. The Framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget
today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be vis-
ited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no bet-
ter measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be
equal in operation. 62
Gunther urged that when the Court does not deploy its officially
strict tier of scrutiny, it routinely takes more care to scrutinize the
congruence between legislative "means'-i.e., the legislative classifi-
cation-and the goals asserted for the statute, so as to assure that
relatively powerless groups were not being discriminated against for
no better reason than that the legislators opted to help their own
friends.' Admittedly, there is a certain unfortunate similarity be-
tween the judicial scrutiny recommended by Gunther and by Justice
Jackson, which would guard against letting the legislature help cer-
tain favored groups, and the much frowned upon myopic scrutiny of
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
" In using the term "candor," I do not mean to imply that the majority has been engaging
in purposeful deception in these outlier cases. Rather, the Court has not taken care to elabo-
rate fully, openly, and, perhaps, introspectively, the various considerations feeding its conclu-
sion that in the given situation the state's policy does not measure up to the Court's standard of
"rationality" (or, as Stevens would have it, "impartiality").
Gunther, supra note 30, at 23.
I& at 37-48. I mean "friends" as a short-hand to include not only personal friends, but
also those groups in the population for whom the legislators may feel extra affinity (such as
those people who are not mentally retarded in Cleburne, Texas).
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the Lochner era that produced statements like, "viewed in the light of
a purely labor law ... we think... that the interest of the public is
not in the slightest degree affected by such an act."" During the
Lochner era, the Court infamously showed itself all too ready to sec-
ond-guess considered legislative judgments as to which groups de-
served legislative assistance in situations where the legislature sin-
cerely saw itself acting for reasons of public policy.65 I take Gunther
(and Justice Jackson) to be arguing not for such second guessing but
simply that the Court should look closely enough to assure itself that
there is indeed a public policy being pursued to a substantial degree
by the law in question. Gunther does not favor ajudicial willingness
to judge the impermissibility of perceived legislative ends or motives.
In its "between-the-tiers" jurisprudence, the Court has shown a will-
ingness to scrutinize both means and ends. When its means scrutiny
has revealed a lack of congruence between the asserted goals of the
law and the classification drawn in the law, the Court has shown a re-
peated propensity to conclude that the most plausible explanation
was that the law's true purpose was to express animus against an un-
popular group." Such animus is the paradigm target of the Equal
Protection Clause.
On one occasion during the twenty-eight years since Justice Pow-
ell's elaborate exercise in denial in Rodriguez, a majority of the Justices
did forthrightly break all the way through the facade of pretense that
there are precisely three tiers of scrutiny: rationality, intermediate,
and strict. In City of Cleburnme five Justices, in one team of two with
Stevens as spokesman and another team of three with Marshall as
spokesman, openly debated the merits of Stevens's fluid rationality
approach versus Marshall's sliding scale of scrutiny approach. The
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTmTUION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) (arguing that this concern, more than devotion to
liberty of contract, was the dominant theme of the era).
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); see also supra tbl. There is a sense in which the distant progeny of Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), not only in the welfare context (including the recent decision
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)), but also in cases involving legislative preference for in-state
corporations, see Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), for long-term in-state
residents, see Hooper v. Bernalillo, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14
(1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) and the ancient preference for property-holders,
see Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989), reflect the flip side of animus: preference for one's
own. See table for fuller case descriptions.
67 In the other cases listed in the table, supra, the Court somewhat pierced the facade. But
those opinions tended to mix rationality language with heightened scrutiny language, without
explaining clearly either what was going on in the case at hand or what goes on as a general
matter when the Court confronts an equal protection problem. The myth of simply three tiers,
with the upper two marked by the presence of a semi-suspect classification, a suspect classifica-
tion, or a fundamental right is simply not tenable when the Court produces so many cases that
do not fit the story.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 432.
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main issue dividing the teams appeared to be Marshall's aversion to
allowing the term "rationality" to be associated with his idea of a slid-
ing scale for the rigor of scrutiny.69 Both sides, however, agreed on
the five essentials:" In equal protection cases the Court varies its in-
sistence (1) on the degree of the importance of the state interest that
must be furthered by the classification; (2) on the required closeness
of fit between the challenged classification and the asserted goals of
the legislation; and (3) on how genuine these goals need to be. The
Court varies these equal protection requirements (4) in direct pro-
portion to the degree of invidiousness of the classification (i.e., the
likelihood that the classification was a product of animus or unreflec-
tive acceptance of an inappropriate stereotype); and (5) in direct
proportion to the importance with respect to constitutional values of
the benefit being restricted or burdened by the classification." Both
Stevens's and Marshall's opinions took the position that it is better
for the Court to be candid about the flexibility of its equal protection
approach than to pretend that it always asks in so-called ordinary
scrutiny cases, "is there any reasonable relation between this classifi-
cation and a legitimate government purpose?"
I am arguing here for judicial candor-or, in the terminology of
Justice Stevens, a fuller explanation from the Court-about the
Court's particularized approach to these between-the-tiers cases, and
I hope that Justice Stevens will one day pen a majority opinion ex-
pressing this as the reigning constitutional doctrine." This frank ex-
Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Marshall's motive here
appears to have been his desire to keep the Court from second-guessing legislatures' economic
policy choices, for which laws the sheer rationality test should be preserved. At least one prob-
lem with Marshall's goal is its conflict with another of his desires: to have legislative classifica-
tions based on poverty be viewed as presumptively invidious. He would no doubt maintain that
the negative presumption attached only to laws burdening the poor, not to those benefiting
them, but when politicians develop rhetoric like "freeing people from welfare dependency" and
when many voters come to believe such rhetoric, then Marshall's distinction becomes difficult
to maintain.
'0 Id. at 455-78 (Marshall,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7' The judge must ask, per Justice Stevens, whether "an impartial lawmaker could logically
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm
to the members of the disadvantaged class." Id. at 452. To judge whether a societal benefit
outweighs or "transcends" a given harm is not a means-end rationality inquiry; it frankly weighs
competing values, some of which have constitutional priority.
7The Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, took an important step in this di-
rection in M.LB. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). There, in explaining its ruling that Mississippi
must waive its (more than $2000) trial transcript fee to enable the indigent M.L.B. to appeal its
termination of her parental rights, Ginsburg said that the ordinary rule that fee requirements
imposed by a state need only satisfy the rationality test does not apply where the deprivation is
so fundamental that the proceeding is better understood as "quasi-criminal" than in terms of its
formal "civil" label. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 124. Granted, in distinguishing a level of ordinary scru-
tiny, where mere rationality is the test, from the more careful scrutiny in M.L.B., Justice Gins-
burg was not following Stevens's lead, but she did follow his lead in a number of other respects.
(1) She avoided talk of one or another tier of "strict" or "intermediate" scrutiny, instead de-
scribing the Court's obligation to make a careful and contextual examination. (2) Her exami-
nation weighed the importance of the deprivation involved (total deprivation of all parental
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planation of what factors the Court weighs and how it assesses the
balance of these factors is precisely what Justice Stevens promoted in
his Cleburne concurrence. Indeed, Justice Stevens would have the
Court provide such an explanation across-the-board for equal protec-
tion analysis, not just after the Court has already concluded that
within a given context a particular right is fundamental. Despite this
qualification, M.L.B. v. S.L.J. may be a sign that the Court is making
progress towards Stevens's goal. Such doctrinal reform promises
salutary effects for the public and for commentators on the Court. A
forthright statement along the lines of, "It]his is what we did, and
here is why it was proper, and here are the considerations that
brought us to this decision," would go a long way toward making such
decisions look less ad hoc, and would also provide useful guidance to
legislators and lower court judges. A reference back to Cleburne by
the Court that pointed out where the majority lined up in terms of
doctrine would provide a legitimate foundation and clarity in prece-
dent for such an assertion.) Most important, however, and contrary
to first impression, this explanatory process might well provide disci-
pline for the Court.
Justice Stevens's Cleburne opinion describes his goal for this ap-
proach simply in terms of informing the public-in his words, more
detail about these various considerations would more "adequately
explain the decisional process." 74 But Justice Marshall details addi-
tional problems that would be alleviated upon the Court's abandon-
ment of its reticence about the flexibility of equal protection scrutiny:
Besides avoiding "[leaving] lower courts.., in the dark" (and one
could add, state legislatures, too),Justice Marshall found that the lack
of candor "provides no principled foundation for determining when
more searching inquiry is to be invoked."7 5 Most significantly, from
the point of view of my argument, Justice Marshall noted that the ju-
dicial development of a doctrinal rule that openly acknowledges the
variety of factors the Court weighs and how it weighs them could pre-
rights-associational rights that the Court has repeatedly termed "fundamental"--against the
state interest in imposing the fee-essentially revenue acquisition). (3) She described this case
as, like other cases that fit into the Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), line of progeny, one
that blends due process concerns with equal protection concerns (although she suggests that
the equal protection element takes priority because there is not a per se due process right of
appeal). M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120. Ginsburg says such cases "cannot be resolved by resort to easy
slogans or pigeonhole analysis," in possible reference to such categories as "intermediate scru-
tiny," or "strict scrutiny." Id. (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666 (1983)). Instead,
she says, "[iun line with [past] decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of the individual
interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on the other."
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21.
" In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Court went back and reassessed the import of
the alignment ofjudicial votes in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), in order to produce a
restatement of reigning political question doctrine. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 232-34. The move I
am suggesting would parallel the one in Baker.
" Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 451-52.
75 Id. at 460.
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vent leaving the Court "unaccountable for its decisions employing, or
refusing to employ, particularly searching scrutiny."76
V. EQUAL PROTECrION CANDOR AND BUSH v. GORI.
7
While there are numerous political scientists who question the ef-
ficacy of legal doctrine as a significant constraint on Supreme Court
behavior, it does seem plausible that, even if only as a matter of
honoring the norms of their profession, Justices to some degree con-
strain their behavior by showing respect for precedent. Thus, it is
conceivable that this particular doctrinal reform might cause Justices
to pay more heed to the obligation to state forthrightly why they are
imposing a given policy under the authorization of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause-simply naming a fundamental right or pointing to a
given classification would not suffice. 9 With particular respect to the
recent controversial Bush v. Goreg decision, such discipline might well
have had a beneficial effect.
Although the per curiam opinion for the Court in Bush v. Gord'
pointed to the presence of a fundamental right to justify its conclu-
76 Ia
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
"See, eg., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
"For instance, in the cases where the Court has declared unconstitutional racially-conscious
voting district lines, drawn for the purpose of enhancing the efficacy of the vote of long-
discriminated-against African-Americans, the Court majority would have to explain clearly why
drawing such lines is invidious, rather than simply invoking the talismanic "suspect classifica-
tion" to strike it down.
531 U.S. at 98.
Id. This Essay is assuming arguendo, that the per curiam opinion for the Court expressed
an actual majority opinion of the Court; my own view, however, is that an analysis of the various
lines of reasoning in the several opinions indicates that there was no real majority. The open-
ing sentence of the Rehnquist three, "We join the per curiam opinion," Bush, 531 U.S. at 111,
appears to be a fig leaf to paper over this fact. The logic of the Rehnquist three points to the
conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court had no business adopting its own policies to guide
the recount and should have instead relied on the discretion of the Florida Secretary of State,
Katherine Harris. Id. at 116. The Secretary of State favored relying on the machine recount
and on those few counties that managed to do a manual recount in time for the (second) certi-
fication deadline. I- at 117.
By contrast, the logic of the per curiam opinion points to the conclusion that the Florida
Supreme Court was obliged to set up detailed interpretive guidelines for deciding how to meas-
ure voter intent on ballots rejected by a variety of different types of counting machines and
vote-recording machines. Id. at 110. In the judgment of the per curiam group, since there was
not adequate time-in light of the constraints of a Presidential election-for such guidelines to
be developed, implemented, and then judged under appeals of the implementation, the per
curiam group fell back on the certification already delivered by the Secretary of State. These
two lines of argument seem to contradict each other directly.
Thus, as I read the breakdown of the actual judicial tally in Bush v. Gore, three Justices
(Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) held for the view that Article II of the Constitution invalidated
the Florida Supreme Court decision. Two Justices (O'Connor and Kennedy) expressed the
view that equal protection plus due process considerations demanded judicially detailed inter-
pretive re-counting guidelines in a state-wide contest of a multi-county re-count where electoral
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sions-namely, the right to cast an "undiluted vote "S2 -it did not
specify with precision the nature of the harm to those persons it be-
lieved were being harmed, the nature of the state benefit being de-
rived from the Florida Supreme Court policy that the United States
Supreme Court's own decision was displacing, nor the reason the ma-
jority believed the perceived harm to voters from the Florida policy
outweighed the perceived benefit to the state from the policy. Had
the Justices felt obliged to do so, by virtue of clear Supreme Court
precedent on the subject, it is at least conceivable that the pressure to
articulate these things would have produced enough re-
conceptualization and re-thinking to cause a different outcome.
Consider first, the nature of the equal protection harm perceived
by the per curiam group. In this instance, the right itself (to cast an
undiluted vote) derived from the Equal Protection Clause, while the
hypothesized harm to the right derived not from a classification (the
equal protection kind of problem), but rather from the absence of
such a classification. The harm was the dilution of real votes by inap-
propriately adding to them hypothesized, partially-marked ballots
that reflected citizen decisions not to vote for that office.ss In other
machinery varied across counties and produced significant disparities in the accuracy of the
tally. Since there was no time to implement this, and since the deadline chosen by the state
legislature (with an eye toward the deadline set by federal law to assure that the state's choice of
electors be the one certified by Congress) already passed, the machine count as supplemented
by a few re-counted counties would suffice as the official count. Two Justices (Breyer and
Souter) took the position that, although equal protection and due process require detailed,
interpretive guidelines, nonetheless, the guidelines should be left to the state supreme court to
develop and to determine as a matter of state law whether the deadline preference (in terms of
Congress's statutory "safe harbor" provision) should prevail over the desire to count every ballot
that clearly manifested voter intent (or at least to attempt to do so) right up until the date
(weeks hence) when Congress would finally announce the outcome of the electoral college
vote. Finally, two Justices (Ginsburg and Stevens) expressed the view that there was no advan-
tage of constitutional dimensions in counting as official-as Katherine Harris's November 26
certification had done and as the per curiam opinion's ostensible December 12 deadline man-
dated-the manual recounts for two originally machine-counted counties (Broward and Volu-
sia, using differing counting mechanisms), the hand-counted absentee ballots, and the machine
recounts of the rest of the counties that had voting machines (and hand recounts of those that
did not), over the state Supreme Court policy of responding to the "contest." The state Su-
preme Court ordered a state-wide manual recount for all counties that had not yet done one, of
all ballots that machines rejected as non-votes ("undervotes") within the statutory standard of
counting any ballot with a clearly discernible voter intent. See Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2000, at A23; see also, E-mail from Michael Masinter, Professor, Nova Law School, to Leslie
Friedman Goldstein, Professor, University of Delaware (January 20, 2001, 15:39:09 EDT) (on
file with author). IndeedJustices Stevens and Ginsburg appear to believe that there was not an
equal protection problem at all with variegated implementation approaches to the Florida
statutory standard of counting every "undercounted" ballot showing a discernible "intent of the
voter," so long as "a single impartial magistrate [would] ultimately adjudicate all objections aris-
ing from the recount process." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also
id. at 143 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
See i& at 105 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
83I ignore for purposes of simplification the contrary problem of failure to recount over-
votes. I ignore it both because the per curiam solution, after it complained of the problem, left
these votes still not reexamined, and because, as Souter and Breyer point out, there was no evi-
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words, the problem here was one of due process: too much un-
channeled discretion left in the hands of administrators, such that
the resulting treatment might contain arbitrary disparities. The per
curiam opinion ignored the in-place solution of allowing appeals to a
single neutral magistrate (other than perhaps to suppose that it
would not have time to operate). Thus, on these combined equal
protection, due process, and fundamental right grounds, the per cu-
riam group in effect ruled that Katherine Harris's second (November
26) certification would be the prevailing electoral count for the State
of Florida.
The per curiam opinion completely neglected to examine and
weigh the Florida Supreme Court's (or the implementing Leon
County judge's) purpose in allowing this flexible standard for deter-
mining voter intent. Indeed, there was evidence in the record that
flexible standards were needed because canvassing boards were un-
covering during recounts certain kinds of ballot errors due not only
to the use of differing kinds of punch styluses across precincts within
a single county, but also due to differing maintenance practices for
electoral machinery. That is, some precincts cleaned out old chads
or replaced old machines less often than other precincts. These
practices produced certain kinds of precinct-specific error patterns
that canvassing boards could discover only in the counting process."
In other words, the per curiam opinion identified what it took to be
the burden on a fundamental right (the threat of some degree of
vote dilution), but it did not specify any purpose the state (supreme
court) may have seen as the overriding public interest in justifying
this burden. Had the per curiam group felt an obligation to specify
these factors and weigh them one against another, their reasoning
may have taken them to a different place. Even without an altered
holding, the presence of a more open explanation concerning these
issues, might have mitigated the level of outrage and disappointment
expressed by a variety of commentators among the Court's attentive
public regarding the cavalier quality of the opinion.
Most importantly, the per curiam group showed no evidence that
it felt any obligation (despite the complaints injustice Ginsburg's dis-
sent on this point)85 to delineate why the due process "remedy" that it
chose was preferable to the state (supreme court) policy it displaced,
in terms of due process for the fundamental right to have one's vote
fully counted. The per curiam opinion effectively reinstated the vote
count of the Florida Secretary of State's second certification of No-
dence in the record that such reexamination would alter any tallies. See id. at 129 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
'" Posting of Steve Semeraro, to CONLAWPROF@listserv.ucla.edu (Dec. 15, 2000) (copy on
file with author) (excerpted from Steve Semeraro, Election Case Analysis (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Professor Semeraro)).
' See Bush, 531 U.S. at 135 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
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vember 26, 2000. This count was based on a second machine recount
statewide in the counties that had voting machines, as supplemented
by hand counts of absentee ballots, hand recounts in non-machine
counties, and by completed manual recounts of previously machine-
recounted Volusia and Broward Counties. 6 Broward County and
Volusia County apparently used differing counting standards for
evaluating voter intent on ballots that were merely dented (or "dim-
pled") rather than punched to the degree that the paper tore open.
Two counties (Palm Beach and Miami-Dade) did not complete re-
counts by the November 26 deadline; the late Palm Beach count was
not included in the certification and the Miami-Dade recount had
been halted in the perception that it could not be completed by the
deadline. In those counties where there had not been a manual (or a
completed manual) recount of machine voting, the ones using punch
machines produced vote totals as follows: The machines rejected all
ballots where the chad piece of the ballot was still attached in some
way if the chad happened to flip shut as the ballot passed through the
machine. This system was widely reported as producing an error rate
of three percent of uncounted, but nonetheless intended and other-
wise proper, votes. 8 Manual recounting is the technique used in
Florida and most other states to correct this error rate problem. De-
spite its assertion that the right to have a fully counted vote is consti-
tutionally fundamental, the per curiam opinion, without explanation,
concluded that this system combining the three percent error rate for
several counties with two counties using varying techniques of ballot
interpretation would be more true to the constitutional due process
obligation to count every vote properly than would the system or-
dered by the Florida Supreme Court, namely to manually examine
every undervote (those missed by machines as votes) and allow ap-
peals contesting interpretation to go to the Leon Countyjudge. It is
not surprising that this absence of explanation angered most of those
commentators who were not already Bush supporters.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court here, to be sure, was pressed for time and
under enormous political pressure, with the scrutiny of the whole
world upon it. My primary goal here has not been to criticize the
craftsmanship of the per curiam opinion. My goal has been rather to
encourage the Court to move its equal protection doctrine in the di-
rection outlined by Justices Marshall and Stevens in their Rodriguez
' According to E-mail from Professor Michael Masinter, supra note 81, despite Florida law
mandating a re-count in elections this close, twenty counties that use optical scanners did not
do any recount for the certification.
" Bush, 531 U.S. at 135.
Many Florida counties used other, much more accurate, systems of voting machinery.
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(Marshall), Craig (Stevens), and Cleburne (both Marshall and Stevens)
opinions. I believe that the ultimate outcome of such a move would
be a tendency for Justices to hold themselves more accountable to
their attentive publics by offering more fully principled and reasoned
equal protection decisions. If this.were to come to pass, both our
constitutional law and our polity would be the better for it.
